

## ITEM 7

### PROPOSED STATEMENT OF DECISION RECONSIDERATION OF PRIOR STATEMENT OF DECISION

Government Code Sections 3300 through 3310

As Added and Amended by Statutes 1976, Chapter 465;  
Statutes 1978, Chapters 775, 1173, 1174, and 1178;  
Statutes 1979, Chapter 405; Statutes 1980, Chapter 1367; Statutes 1982, Chapter 994;  
Statutes 1983, Chapter 964; Statutes 1989, Chapter 1165; and  
Statutes 1990, Chapter 675 (CSM 4499)

*Peace Officer Procedural Bill of Rights*  
05-RL-4499-01, (CSM-4499)

Reconsideration Directed by Government Code Section 3313  
(Stats. 2005, ch. 72, § 6 (Assem. Bill (AB) No. 138), eff. July 19, 2005)

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#### Executive Summary

The sole issue before the Commission on State Mandates (“Commission”) is whether the Proposed Statement of Decision accurately reflects the Commission’s decision on the reconsideration of *Peace Officer Procedural Bill of Rights*.<sup>1</sup>

#### Recommendation

Staff recommends that the Commission adopt the Proposed Statement of Decision, beginning on page three, which accurately reflects the staff analysis and recommendation on the reconsideration of this test claim. Minor changes, including those that reflect the hearing testimony and vote count, will be included when issuing the final Statement of Decision.

If the Commission’s vote on item 6 modifies the staff analysis, staff recommends that the motion to adopt the Proposed Statement of Decision reflect those changes, which will be made before issuing the final Statement of Decision. Alternatively, if the changes are significant, staff recommends that adoption of a Proposed Statement of Decision be continued to the May 2006 Commission hearing.

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<sup>1</sup> California Code of Regulations, title 2, section 1188.1, subdivision (a).



BEFORE THE  
COMMISSION ON STATE MANDATES  
STATE OF CALIFORNIA

RECONSIDERATION OF PRIOR  
STATEMENT OF DECISION ON:

Government Code Sections 3300 through 3310

As Added and Amended by Statutes 1976,  
Chapter 465; Statutes 1978, Chapters 775, 1173,  
1174, and 1178; Statutes 1979, Chapter 405;  
Statutes 1980, Chapter 1367; Statutes 1982,  
Chapter 994; Statutes 1983, Chapter 964;  
Statutes 1989, Chapter 1165; and  
Statutes 1990, Chapter 675 (CSM 4499)

Directed by Government Code Section 3313,  
Statutes 2005, chapter 72, section 6  
(Assem. Bill (AB) No. 138)

Effective July 19, 2005.

**Case No.: 05-RL-4499-01**

***Peace Officer Procedural Bill of Rights***

PROPOSED STATEMENT OF DECISION  
PURSUANT TO GOVERNMENT CODE  
SECTION 17500 ET SEQ.; CALIFORNIA  
CODE OF REGULATIONS, TITLE 2,  
DIVISION 2, CHAPTER 2.5, ARTICLE 7

(Proposed for Adoption on April 26, 2006)

**PROPOSED STATEMENT OF DECISION**

The Commission on State Mandates (“Commission”) heard and decided this test claim during a regularly scheduled hearing on April 26, 2006. [Witness list will be included in the final Statement of Decision.]

The law applicable to the Commission’s determination of a reimbursable state-mandated program is article XIII B, section 6 of the California Constitution, Government Code section 17500 et seq., and related case law.

The Commission [adopted/modified] the staff analysis to partially approve the test claim at the hearing by a vote of [vote count will be included in the final Statement of Decision].

**Summary of Findings**

Statutes 2005, chapter 72, section 6 (AB 138) added section 3313 to the Government Code to direct the Commission to “review” the Statement of Decision, adopted in 1999, on the *Peace Officer Procedural Bill of Rights* test claim (commonly abbreviated as “POBOR”) to clarify whether the subject legislation imposed a mandate consistent with California Supreme Court Decision in *San Diego Unified School Dist. v. Commission on State Mandates* (2004) 33 Cal.4th 859 and other applicable court decisions.

In 1999, the Commission approved the test claim and adopted the original Statement of Decision. The Commission found that certain procedural requirements under POBOR were rights already provided to public employees under the due process clause of the

United States and California Constitutions. Thus, the Commission denied the procedural requirements of POBOR that were already required by law on the ground that they did not impose a new program or higher level of service, or impose costs mandated by the state pursuant to Government Code section 17556, subdivision (c). Government Code section 17556, subdivision (c), generally provides that the Commission shall not find costs mandated by the state for test claim statutes that implement a federal law, unless the test claim statute mandates costs that exceed the federal mandate. The Commission approved the activities required by POBOR that exceeded the requirements of existing state and federal law.

On July 27, 2000, the Commission adopted parameters and guidelines that authorized reimbursement, beginning July 1, 1994, to counties, cities, a city and county, school districts, and special districts that employ peace officers for the ongoing activities summarized below:

- Developing or updating policies and procedures.
- Training for human resources, law enforcement, and legal counsel.
- Updating the status of cases.
- Providing the opportunity for an administrative appeal for permanent, at-will, and probationary employees that were subject to certain disciplinary actions that were not covered by the due process clause of state and federal law.
- When a peace officer is under investigation, or becomes a witness to an incident under investigation, and is subjected to an interrogation by the employer that could lead to certain disciplinary actions, the following costs and activities are eligible for reimbursement: compensation to the peace officer for interrogations occurring during off-duty time; providing prior notice to the peace officer regarding the nature of the interrogation and identification of investigating officers; tape recording the interrogation; providing the peace officer employee with access to the tape prior to any further interrogation at a subsequent time or if any further specified proceedings are contemplated; and producing transcribed copies of any notes made by a stenographer at an interrogation, and copies of complaints of reports or complaints made by investigators.
- Performing certain activities, specified by the type of local agency or school district, upon the receipt of an adverse comment against a peace officer employee.

On review of this claim pursuant to Government Code section 3313, the Commission finds that the *San Diego Unified School Dist.* case supports the Commission's 1999 Statement of Decision, which found that the POBOR legislation constitutes a state-mandated program within the meaning of article XIII B, section 6 of the California Constitution for counties, cities, school districts, and special districts identified in Government Code section 3301 that employ peace officers.

The Commission further finds that the *San Diego Unified School Dist.* case supports the Commission's 1999 Statement of Decision that the test claim legislation constitutes a partial reimbursable state-mandated program within the meaning of article XIII B,

section 6 of the California Constitution and Government Code section 17514 for all activities previously approved by the Commission except the following:

- The activity of providing the opportunity for an administrative appeal to probationary and at-will peace officers (except when the chief of police is removed) pursuant to Government Code section 3304 is no longer a reimbursable state-mandated activity because the Legislature amended Government Code section 3304 in 1998. The amendment limited the right to an administrative appeal to only those peace officers “who successfully completed the probationary period that may be required” by the employing agency and to situations where the chief of police is removed. (Stats. 1998, ch. 786, § 1.)
- The activities of obtaining the signature of the peace officer on the adverse comment or noting the officer’s refusal to sign the adverse comment, pursuant to Government Code sections 3305 and 3306, when the adverse comment results in a punitive action protected by the due process clause<sup>2</sup> does not constitute a new program or higher level of service and does not impose costs mandated by the state pursuant to Government Code section 17556, subdivision (c).

### **BACKGROUND**

Statutes 2005, chapter 72, section 6 (AB 138) added section 3313 to the Government Code to direct the Commission to “review” the Statement of Decision, adopted in 1999, on the *Peace Officer Procedural Bill of Rights* test claim. Government Code section 3313 states the following:

In the 2005-06 fiscal year, the Commission on State Mandates shall review its statement of decision regarding the Peace Officer Procedural Bill of Rights test claim and make any modifications necessary to this decision to clarify whether the subject legislation imposed a mandate consistent with California Supreme Court Decision in *San Diego Unified School Dist. v. Commission on State Mandates* (2004) 33 Cal.4th 859 and other applicable court decisions. If the Commission on State Mandates revises its statement of decision regarding the Peace Officer Procedural Bill of Rights test claim, the revised decision shall apply to local government Peace Office Procedural Bill of Rights activities occurring after the date the revised decision is adopted.

#### Commission’s Decision on *Peace Officer Procedural Bill of Rights* (CSM 4499)

The Legislature enacted the Peace Officers Procedural Bill of Rights Act (commonly abbreviated as “POBOR”), by adding Government Code sections 3300 through 3310, in 1976. POBOR provides a series of rights and procedural safeguards to peace officers employed by local agencies and school districts that are subject to investigation or

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<sup>2</sup> Due process attaches when a permanent employee is dismissed, demoted, suspended, receives a reduction in salary, or receives a written reprimand. Due process also attaches when the charges supporting a dismissal of a probationary or at-will employee constitute moral turpitude that harms the employee’s reputation and ability to find future employment and, thus, a name-clearing hearing is required.

discipline. Generally, POBOR prescribes certain protections that must be afforded officers during interrogations that could lead to punitive action against them; gives officers the right to review and respond in writing to adverse comments entered in their personnel files; and gives officers the right to an administrative appeal when any punitive action is taken against them, or they are denied promotion on grounds other than merit.<sup>3</sup>

Legislative intent for POBOR is expressly provided in Government Code section 3301 as follows:

The Legislature hereby finds and declares that the rights and protections provided to peace officers under this chapter constitute a matter of statewide concern. The Legislature further finds and declares that effective law enforcement depends upon the maintenance of stable employer-employee relations, between public safety employees and their employers. In order to assure that stable relations are continued throughout the state and to further assure that effective services are provided to all people of the state, it is necessary that this chapter be applicable to all public safety officers, as defined in this section, within the State of California.

POBOR applies to all employees classified as “peace officers” under specified provisions of the Penal Code, including those peace officers employed by counties, cities, special districts and school districts.<sup>4</sup>

In 1995, the City of Sacramento filed a test claim alleging that POBOR, as it existed from 1976 until 1990, constituted a reimbursable state-mandated program within the meaning of article XIII B, section 6 of the California Constitution.<sup>5</sup> In 1999, the Commission approved the test claim and adopted a Statement of Decision.<sup>6</sup> The Commission found that certain procedural requirements under POBOR were rights already provided to public employees under the due process clause of the United States and California Constitutions. Thus, the Commission denied the procedural requirements of POBOR that were already required by law on the ground that they did not impose a new program or

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<sup>3</sup> See California Supreme Court’s summary of the legislation in *Baggett v. Gates* (1982) 32 Cal.3d 128, 135.

<sup>4</sup> Government Code section 3301 states: “For purposes of this chapter, the term public safety officer means all peace officers specified in Sections 830.1, 830.2, 830.3, 830.31, 830.32, 830.33, except subdivision (e), 830.34, 830.35, except subdivision (c), 830.36, 830.37, 830.38, 830.4, and 830.5 of the Penal Code.”

<sup>5</sup> The POBOR Act has been subsequently amended by the Legislature. (See Stats. 1994, ch. 1259; Stats. 1997, ch. 148; Stats. 1998, ch. 263; Stats. 1998, ch. 786; Stats. 1999, ch. 338; Stats. 2000, ch. 209; Stats. 2002, ch. 1156; Stats. 2003, ch. 876; Stats. 2004, ch. 405; and Stats. 2005, ch. 22.) These subsequent amendments are outside the scope of the Commission’s decision in POBOR (CSM 4499), and therefore are *not* analyzed to determine whether they impose reimbursable state-mandated activities within the meaning of article XIII B, section 6.

<sup>6</sup> Administrative Record, page 859.

higher level of service, or impose costs mandated by the state pursuant to Government Code section 17556, subdivision (c). Government Code section 17556, subdivision (c), generally provides that the Commission shall not find costs mandated by the state for test claim statutes that implement a federal law, unless the test claim statute mandates costs that exceed the federal mandate. The Commission approved the activities required by POBOR that exceeded the requirements of existing state and federal law.

On July 27, 2000, the Commission adopted parameters and guidelines that authorized reimbursement, beginning July 1, 1994, to counties, cities, a city and county, school districts, and special districts that employ peace officers for the ongoing activities summarized below:

- Developing or updating policies and procedures.
- Training for human resources, law enforcement, and legal counsel.
- Updating the status of cases.
- Providing the opportunity for an administrative appeal for permanent, at-will, and probationary employees that were subject to certain disciplinary actions that were not covered by the due process clause of state and federal law.
- When a peace officer is under investigation, or becomes a witness to an incident under investigation, and is subjected to an interrogation by the employer that could lead to certain disciplinary actions, the following costs and activities are eligible for reimbursement: compensation to the peace officer for interrogations occurring during off-duty time; providing prior notice to the peace officer regarding the nature of the interrogation and identification of investigating officers; tape recording the interrogation; providing the peace officer employee with access to the tape prior to any further interrogation at a subsequent time or if any further specified proceedings are contemplated; and producing transcribed copies of any notes made by a stenographer at an interrogation, and copies of complaints of reports or complaints made by investigators.
- Performing certain activities, specified by the type of local agency or school district, upon the receipt of an adverse comment against a peace officer employee.<sup>7</sup>

On March 29, 2001, the Commission adopted a statewide cost estimate covering fiscal years 1994-1995 through 2001-2002 in the amount of \$152,506,000.<sup>8</sup>

#### Audit by the Bureau of State Audits

The Legislative Analyst's Office (LAO), in its Analysis of the 2002-2003 Budget Bill, reviewed a sample of POBOR reimbursement claims and found that the annual state costs associated with the program was likely to be two to three times higher than the amount projected in the statewide cost estimate and significantly higher than what the Legislature initially expected. LAO projected costs in the range of \$50 to \$75 million annually.

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<sup>7</sup> Administrative Record, page 1273.

<sup>8</sup> Administrative Record, page 1309.

LAO also found a wide variation in the costs claimed by local governments. Thus, LAO recommended that the Legislature refer the POBOR program to the Joint Legislative Audit Committee for review, possible state audit, and possible revisions to the parameters and guidelines.

In March 2003, the Joint Legislative Audit Committee authorized the Bureau of State Audits to conduct an audit of the process used by the Commission to develop statewide cost estimates and to establish parameters and guidelines for the claims related to POBOR.

On October 15, 2003, the Bureau of State Audits issued its audit report, finding that reimbursement claims were significantly higher than anticipated and that some agencies claimed reimbursement for questionable activities.<sup>9</sup> While the Bureau of State Audits recommended the Commission make changes to the overall mandates process, it did not recommend the Commission make any changes to the parameters and guidelines for the POBOR program. The Commission implemented all of the Bureau's recommendations.

On July 19, 2005, the Legislature enacted Government Code section 3313 (Stats. 2005, ch. 72, § 6 (AB 138)) and directed the Commission to "review" the Statement of Decision in POBOR.

#### **Comments Filed Before the Issuance of the Draft Staff Analysis by the City and County of Los Angeles**

On October 19, 2005, Commission staff requested comments from interested parties, affected state agencies, and interested persons on the Legislature's directive to "review" the POBOR program. Comments were received from the City of Los Angeles and the County of Los Angeles. The City and County both contend that the Commission properly found that POBOR constitutes a reimbursable state-mandated program within the meaning of article XIII B, section 6 of the California Constitution. The County further argues that, under the California Supreme Court decision in *San Diego Unified School District v. Commission on State Mandates* (2004) 33 Cal.4th 859, reimbursement must be expanded to include all activities required under the test claim statutes including those procedures required by the federal due process clause. The County of Los Angeles also proposes that the Commission adopt a reasonable reimbursement methodology in the parameters and guidelines to reimburse these claims.

#### **Comments Filed on the Draft Staff Analysis**

On February 24, 2006, Commission staff issued the draft staff analysis and requested comments on the draft. The Commission received responses from the following parties:

##### City of Sacramento

The City of Sacramento argues the following:

- Prior law does not require due process protections for employees receiving short-term suspensions, reclassifications, or reprimands. Therefore, the administrative appeal required by the test claim legislation constitutes a new program or higher

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<sup>9</sup> Administrative Record, page 1407 et seq.



level of service when an officer receives a short-term suspension, reclassification, or reprimand.

- Not every termination of a police chief warrants a liberty interest hearing required under prior law. The decision of the Commission should distinguish between those situations where there is a valid right to a liberty interest hearing under principles of due process, from the remaining situations where a police chief is terminated.
- The decision of the Commission should reflect “the onerous requirements imposed when interrogations are handled under POBOR.”
- All activities required when an officer receives an adverse comment are reimbursable.

#### County of Alameda

The County of Alameda states that interrogation of a sworn officer under POBOR is difficult and requires preparation. The County alleges that ten hours of investigation must be conducted before an interview that might take thirty minutes.

#### County of Los Angeles

The County of Los Angeles contends that investigation is a reimbursable state-mandated activity. The County also argues that, pursuant to the *San Diego Unified School Dist.* case, all due process activities are reimbursable.

#### County of Orange

The County of Orange believes the staff analysis “does not fully comprehend or account for the [investigation] requirements of interrogation governed by Government Code section 3303.” The County contends that the requirements of law enforcement agencies to investigate complaints have correspondingly increased under POBOR. When a complaint is received, the County argues that “every department is called upon to conduct very detailed investigations when allegations of serious misconduct occur. These investigations can vary in scope and depth from abuses of authority, the use of deadly force, excessive force where injuries may be significant, serious property damage, and criminal behavior.” The County also contends that the investigation involves the subject officer and other officer witnesses.

#### Department of Finance

The Department of Finance contends that the *San Diego Unified School Dist.* case does not support the finding that the test claim legislation constitutes a reimbursable state-mandated program for school districts. Finance acknowledges the language in *San Diego Unified School Dist.* declining to extend the *City of Merced* decision to preclude reimbursement whenever any entity makes a discretionary decision that triggers mandated costs. Finance argues, however, that the Supreme Court’s findings are not applicable to school districts since there is no requirement in law for school districts to form a police department. Finance states the following:

. . . there is no requirement in law for these districts to form a police department and safe schools can be maintained without the need to hire

police officers as is evidenced by the many school districts that do not have police departments. The fact that the Legislature has declared it necessary for POBOR to apply to all public safety officers is not the same as requiring their hiring in the first place. School districts could, indeed, control or even avoid the extra cost of the POBOR legislation by not forming a police department at all, which is materially different from fire protection services that must be provided by fire protection districts. POBOR activities that might be claimed by school districts are, instead, analogous to non-reimbursable activities in the *Department of Finance v. Commission on State Mandates [Kern High School Dist.]* case that flowed from an underlying exercise of discretion and those in past Commission decisions that denied reimbursement to school districts for other peace officer activities.

### **Discussion**

The courts have found that article XIII B, section 6 of the California Constitution<sup>10</sup> recognizes the state constitutional restrictions on the powers of local government to tax and spend.<sup>11</sup> “Its purpose is to preclude the state from shifting financial responsibility for carrying out governmental functions to local agencies, which are ‘ill equipped’ to assume increased financial responsibilities because of the taxing and spending limitations that articles XIII A and XIII B impose.”<sup>12</sup> A test claim statute or executive order may impose a reimbursable state-mandated program if it orders or commands a local agency or school district to engage in an activity or task.<sup>13</sup> In addition, the required activity or task must be new, constituting a “new program,” or it must create a “higher level of service” over the previously required level of service.<sup>14</sup>

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<sup>10</sup> Article XIII B, section 6, subdivision (a), (as amended by Proposition 1A in November 2004) provides: “(a) Whenever the Legislature or any state agency mandates a new program or higher level of service on any local government, the State shall provide a subvention of funds to reimburse that local government for the costs of the program or increased level of service, except that the Legislature may, but need not, provide a subvention of funds for the following mandates: (1) Legislative mandates requested by the local agency affected. (2) Legislation defining a new crime or changing an existing definition of a crime. (3) Legislative mandates enacted prior to January 1, 1975, or executive orders or regulations initially implementing legislation enacted prior to January 1, 1975.”

<sup>11</sup> *Department of Finance v. Commission on State Mandates (Kern High School Dist.)* (2003) 30 Cal.4th 727, 735.

<sup>12</sup> *County of San Diego v. State of California* (1997) 15 Cal.4th 68, 81.

<sup>13</sup> *Long Beach Unified School Dist. v. State of California* (1990) 225 Cal.App.3d 155, 174.

<sup>14</sup> *San Diego Unified School Dist. v. Commission on State Mandates* (2004) 33 Cal.4th 859, 878 (*San Diego Unified School Dist.*); *Lucia Mar Unified School District v. Honig* (1988) 44 Cal.3d 830, 835-836 (*Lucia Mar*).

The courts have defined a “program” subject to article XIII B, section 6, of the California Constitution, as one that carries out the governmental function of providing public services, or a law that imposes unique requirements on local agencies or school districts to implement a state policy, but does not apply generally to all residents and entities in the state.<sup>15</sup> To determine if the program is new or imposes a higher level of service, the test claim legislation must be compared with the legal requirements in effect immediately before the enactment of the test claim legislation.<sup>16</sup> A “higher level of service” occurs when the new “requirements were intended to provide an enhanced service to the public.”<sup>17</sup>

Finally, the newly required activity or increased level of service must impose costs mandated by the state.<sup>18</sup>

The Commission is vested with exclusive authority to adjudicate disputes over the existence of state-mandated programs within the meaning of article XIII B, section 6.<sup>19</sup> In making its decisions, the Commission must strictly construe article XIII B, section 6 and not apply it as an “equitable remedy to cure the perceived unfairness resulting from political decisions on funding priorities.”<sup>20</sup>

#### **I. Commission Jurisdiction and Period of Reimbursement for Decision on Reconsideration**

It is a well-settled issue of law that administrative agencies, such as the Commission, are entities of limited jurisdiction. Administrative agencies have only the powers that have been conferred on them, expressly or by implication, by statute or constitution. The Commission’s jurisdiction in this case is based solely on Government Code section 3313. Absent Government Code section 3313, the Commission would have no jurisdiction to review and reconsider its decision on POBOR since the decision was adopted and issued well over 30 days ago.<sup>21</sup>

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<sup>15</sup> *San Diego Unified School Dist.*, *supra*, 33 Cal.4th 859, 874, (reaffirming the test set out in *County of Los Angeles v. State of California* (1987) 43 Cal.3d 46, 56; *Lucia Mar*, *supra*, 44 Cal.3d 830, 835.)

<sup>16</sup> *San Diego Unified School Dist.*, *supra*, 33 Cal.4th 859, 878; *Lucia Mar*, *supra*, 44 Cal.3d 830, 835.

<sup>17</sup> *San Diego Unified School Dist.*, *supra*, 33 Cal.4th 859, 878.

<sup>18</sup> *County of Fresno v. State of California* (1991) 53 Cal.3d 482, 487; *County of Sonoma v. Commission on State Mandates* (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 1265, 1284 (*County of Sonoma*); Government Code sections 17514 and 17556.

<sup>19</sup> *Kinlaw v. State of California* (1991) 54 Cal.3d 326, 331-334; Government Code sections 17551, 17552.

<sup>20</sup> *County of Sonoma*, *supra*, 84 Cal.App.4th 1265, 1280, citing *City of San Jose v. State of California* (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 1802, 1817.

<sup>21</sup> Government Code section 17559.

Thus, the Commission must act within the jurisdiction granted by Government Code section 3313, and may not substitute its judgment regarding the scope of its jurisdiction on reconsideration for that of the Legislature.<sup>22</sup> Since an action by the Commission is void if its action is in excess of the powers conferred by statute, the Commission must narrowly construe the provisions of Government Code section 3313.

Government Code section 3313 provides:

In the 2005-06 fiscal year, the Commission on State Mandates shall review its statement of decision regarding the Peace Officer Procedural Bill of Rights test claim and make any modifications necessary to this decision *to clarify whether the subject legislation imposed a mandate consistent with California Supreme Court Decision in San Diego Unified School Dist. v. Commission on State Mandates (2004) 33 Cal.4th 859 and other applicable court decisions.* If the Commission on State Mandates revises its statement of decision regarding the Peace Officer Procedural Bill of Rights test claim, the revised decision shall apply to local government Peace Office Procedural Bill of Rights activities occurring after the date the revised decision is adopted. (Emphasis added.)

The Commission’s jurisdiction on review is limited by Government Code section 3313, to clarify whether the subject legislation imposed a mandate consistent with California Supreme Court Decision in *San Diego Unified School Dist. ... and other applicable court decisions.*”

In addition, Government Code section 3313 states that “the revised decision shall apply to local government Peace Officer Procedural Bill of Rights activities *occurring after the date the revised decision is adopted.*” Thus, the Commission finds that the decision adopted by the Commission on this reconsideration or “review” of POBOR applies to costs incurred and claimed for the 2006-2007 fiscal year.

## **II. Is the test claim legislation subject to article XIII B, section 6 of the California Constitution?**

In 1999, the Commission found that the test claim legislation mandates law enforcement agencies to take specified procedural steps when investigating or disciplining a peace officer employee.<sup>23</sup> The Commission found that Government Code section 3304 mandates, under specified circumstances, that “no punitive action [‘any action that may lead to dismissal, demotion, suspension, reduction in salary, written reprimand, or transfer for purposes of punishment’], nor denial of promotion on grounds other than merit, shall be undertaken by any public agency without providing the public safety officer with an opportunity for administrative appeal.”

The Commission also found that the following activities are mandated by Government Code section 3303 when the employer wants to interrogate an officer:

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<sup>22</sup> *Cal. State Restaurant Assn. v. Whitlow* (1976) 58 Cal.App.3d 340, 346-347.

<sup>23</sup> Original Statement of Decision (AR, p. 862).

- When required by the seriousness of the investigation, compensating the peace officer for interrogations occurring during off-duty time in accordance with regular department procedures. (Gov. Code, § 3303, subd. (a).)
- Providing prior notice to the peace officer regarding the nature of the interrogation and identification of the investigating officers. (Gov. Code, § 3303, subds. (b) and (c).)
- Providing the peace officer employee with access to a tape recording of his or her interrogation prior to any further interrogation at a subsequent time, as specified. (Gov. Code, § 3303, subd. (g).)
- Under specified circumstances, producing transcribed copies of any notes made by a stenographer at an interrogation, and copies of reports or complaints made by investigators or other persons when requested by the officer. (Gov. Code, § 3303, subd. (g).)

Finally, Government Code sections 3305 and 3306 provide that no peace officer shall have any adverse comment entered into the officer's personnel file without having first read and signed the adverse comment. If the peace officer refuses to sign the adverse comment, that fact shall be noted on the document and signed or initialed by the peace officer. In addition, the peace officer shall have 30 days to file a written response to any adverse comment entered into the personnel file. The Commission found that Government Code sections 3305 and 3306 impose the following requirements on employers before an adverse comment is placed in an officer's personnel file:

- To provide notice of the adverse comment to the officer.
- To provide an opportunity to review and sign the adverse comment.
- To provide an opportunity to respond to the adverse comment within 30 days.
- To note on the document that the peace officer refused to sign the adverse comment and to obtain the peace officer's signature or initials under such circumstances.

POBOR, by the terms set forth in Government Code section 3301, expressly applies to counties, cities, school districts, and special districts and the Commission approved the test claim for these local entities. Government Code section 3301 states the following: "For purposes of this chapter, the term public safety officer means all peace officers specified in Sections 830.1, 830.2, 830.3, 830.31, 830.32, 830.33, except subdivision (e), 830.34, 830.35, except subdivision (c), 830.36, 830.37, 830.4, and 830.5 of the Penal Code." The legislation, however, does not apply to reserve or recruit officers,<sup>24</sup> coroners, or railroad police officers commissioned by the Governor.

Government Code section 3313 requires the Commission to review these findings to clarify whether the subject legislation imposes a mandate consistent with the California Supreme Court Decision in *San Diego Unified School Dist.* and other applicable court decisions.

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<sup>24</sup> *Burden v. Snowden* (1992) 2 Cal.4th 556, 569.

Generally, in order for test claim legislation to impose a reimbursable state-mandated program, the statutory language must mandate an activity or task on local governmental entities. If the statutory language does not impose a mandate, then article XIII B, section 6 of the California Constitution is not triggered and reimbursement is not required.

In the present case, although the procedural rights and protections afforded a peace officer under POBOR are expressly required by statute, the required activities are not triggered until the employing agency makes certain local decisions. For example, in the case of a city or county, agencies that are required by the Constitution to employ peace officers,<sup>25</sup> the POBOR activities are not triggered until the city or county decides to interrogate the officer, take punitive action against the officer, or place an adverse comment in the officer's personnel file. These initial decisions are not expressly mandated by state law, but are governed by local policy, ordinance, city charter, or memorandum of understanding.<sup>26</sup>

In the case of a school district or special district, the POBOR requirements are not triggered until the school district or special district (1) decides to exercise the statutory authority to employ peace officers, and (2) decides to interrogate the officer, take punitive action against the officer, or place an adverse comment in the officer's personnel file.

After the Commission issued its decision in this case, two California Supreme Court decisions were decided that address the "mandate" issue; *Kern High School Dist.* and *San Diego Unified School Dist.*<sup>27</sup> Thus, based on the court's ruling in these cases, the issue is whether the test claim legislation constitutes a state-mandated program within the meaning of article XIII B, section 6 in light of the local decisions that trigger the POBOR requirements.

As described below, the Legislature expressly declared its intent that the POBOR legislation is a matter of statewide concern and was designed to assure that effective police protection services are provided to all people of the state. The California Supreme Court found that POBOR protects the health, safety, and welfare of the citizens. Thus,

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<sup>25</sup> Article XI of the California Constitution provides for the formation of cities and counties. Section 1, Counties, states that the Legislature shall provide for an elected county sheriff. Section 5, City charter provision, specifies that city charters are to provide for the "government of the city police force."

<sup>26</sup> See *Baggett v. Gates* (1982) 32 Cal.3d 128, 137-140, where the California Supreme Court determined that POBOR *does not* (1) interfere with the setting of peace officers' compensation, (2) regulate qualifications for employment, (3) regulate the manner, method, times, or terms for which a peace officer shall be elected or appointed, nor does it (4) affect the tenure of office or purpose to regulate or specify the causes for which a peace officer can be removed. These are local decisions. But the court found that POBOR impinges on the city's implied power to determine the *manner* in which an employee can be disciplined.

<sup>27</sup> *Kern High School Dist.*, *supra*, 30 Cal.4th 727; *San Diego Unified School Dist.*, *supra*, 33 Cal.4th 859.

based on the facts of this case, the Commission finds that the Supreme Court’s decision in *San Diego Unified School Dist.* supports the Commission’s original finding that the test claim legislation constitutes a state-mandated program for cities, counties, school districts, and special districts as described below.

**A. POBOR constitutes a state-mandated program even though a local decision is first made to interrogate the officer, take punitive action against the officer, or place an adverse comment in the officer’s personnel file.**

The procedural rights and protections afforded a peace officer under POBOR are required by statute. The rights are not triggered, however, until the employing agency decides to interrogate an officer, take punitive action against the officer, or place an adverse comment in an officer’s personnel file. These initial decisions are not mandated by the state, but are governed by local policy, ordinance, city charter, or a memorandum of understanding.

Nevertheless, based on findings made by the California Supreme Court regarding the POBOR legislation and in *San Diego Unified School Dist.*, the Commission finds that the test claim legislation constitutes a state-mandated program within the meaning of article XIII B, section 6 of the California Constitution.

After the Commission issued its Statement of Decision in this case, the California Supreme Court decided the *Kern High School Dist.* case and considered the meaning of the term “state mandate” as it appears in article XIII B, section 6 of the California Constitution.<sup>28</sup> In *Kern High School Dist.*, school districts requested reimbursement for notice and agenda costs for meetings of their school site councils and advisory bodies. These bodies were established as a condition of various education-related programs that were funded by the state and federal government.

When analyzing the term “state mandate,” the court reviewed the ballot materials for article XIII B, which provided that “a state mandate comprises something that a local government entity is required or forced to do.”<sup>29</sup> The ballot summary by the Legislative Analyst further defined “state mandates” as “requirements imposed on local governments by legislation or executive orders.”<sup>30</sup>

The court also reviewed and affirmed the holding of *City of Merced v. State of California* (1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 777, determining that, when analyzing state-mandate claims, the Commission must look at the underlying program to determine if the claimant’s participation in the underlying program is voluntary or legally compelled.<sup>31</sup> The court stated the following:

In *City of Merced*, the city was under no legal compulsion to resort to eminent domain-but when it elected to employ that means of acquiring property, its obligation to compensate for lost business goodwill was not a

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<sup>28</sup> *Kern High School Dist.*, *supra*, 30 Cal.4th 727.

<sup>29</sup> *Id.* at page 737.

<sup>30</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>31</sup> *Id.* at page 743.

reimbursable state mandate, because the city was not required to employ eminent domain in the first place. Here as well, if a school district elects to participate in or continue participation in any underlying *voluntary* education-related funded program, the district’s obligation to comply with the notice and agenda requirements related to that program does not constitute a reimbursable state mandate. (Emphasis in original.)<sup>32</sup>

Thus, the Supreme Court held as follows:

[W]e reject claimants’ assertion that they have been legally compelled to incur notice and agenda costs, and hence are entitled to reimbursement from the state, based merely upon the circumstance that notice and agenda provisions are mandatory elements of education-related programs in which claimants have participated, *without regard to whether claimant’s participation in the underlying program is voluntary or compelled.* [Emphasis added.]<sup>33</sup>

Based on the plain language of the statutes creating the underlying education programs in *Kern High School Dist.*, the court determined that school districts were not legally compelled to participate in eight of the nine underlying programs.<sup>34</sup>

The school districts in *Kern High School Dist.*, however, urged the court to define “state mandate” broadly to include situations where participation in the program is coerced as a result of severe penalties that would be imposed for noncompliance. The court previously applied such a broad construction to the definition of a federal mandate in the case of *City of Sacramento v. State* (1990) 50 Cal.3d 51, 74, where the state’s failure to comply with federal legislation that extended mandatory coverage under the state’s unemployment insurance law would result in California businesses facing “a new and serious penalty – full, double unemployment taxation by both state and federal governments.”<sup>35</sup> Although the court in *Kern High School Dist.* declined to apply the reasoning in *City of Sacramento* that a state mandate may be found in the absence of strict legal compulsion on the facts before it in *Kern*, after reflecting on the purpose of article XIII B, section 6 – to preclude the state from shifting financial responsibilities onto local agencies that have limited tax revenue– the court stated:

In light of that purpose, we do not foreclose the possibility that a reimbursable state mandate under article XIII B, section 6, properly might be found in some circumstances in which a local entity is not legally compelled to participate in a program that requires it to expend additional funds.<sup>36</sup>

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<sup>32</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>33</sup> *Id.* at page 731.

<sup>34</sup> *Id.* at pages 744-745.

<sup>35</sup> *City of Sacramento, supra*, 50 Cal.3d 51, 74.

<sup>36</sup> *Kern High School Dist., supra*, 30 Cal.4th 727, 752.



Thus, the court in *Kern* recognized that there could be a case, based on its facts, where reimbursement would be required under article XIII B, section 6 in circumstances where the local entity was not legally compelled to participate in a program.

One year later, the Supreme Court revisited the “mandate” issue in *San Diego Unified School Dist.*, a case that addressed a challenge to a Commission decision involving a school district’s expulsion of a student. The school district acknowledged that under specified circumstances, the statutory scheme at issue in the case gave school districts discretion to expel a student. The district nevertheless argued that it was mandated to incur the costs associated with the due process hearing required by the test claim legislation when a student is expelled. The district argued that “although any particular expulsion recommendation may be discretionary, as a practical matter it is inevitable that some school expulsions will occur in the administration of any public school program” and, thus, the ruling in *City of Merced* should not apply.<sup>37</sup>

In *San Diego Unified School Dist.*, the Supreme Court did not overrule the *Kern* or *City of Merced* cases, but stated that “[u]pon reflection, we agree with the District and amici curiae that there is reason to question an extension of the holding of *City of Merced* so as to preclude reimbursement under article XIII B, section 6 of the state Constitution and Government Code section 17514, whenever an entity makes an initial discretionary decision that in turn triggers mandated costs.”<sup>38</sup> The court explained as follows:

Indeed, it would appear that under a strict application of the language of *City of Merced*, public entities would be denied reimbursement for state-mandated costs in apparent contravention of the intent underlying article XIII B, section 6 of the state Constitution and Government Code section 17514 and contrary to past decisions in which it has been established that reimbursement was in fact proper. For example, in *Carmel Valley* [citation omitted] an executive order requiring that county firefighters be provided with protective clothing and safety equipment was found to create a reimbursable state mandate for the added costs of such clothing and equipment. [Citation omitted.] the court in *Carmel Valley* apparently did not contemplate that reimbursement would be foreclosed in that setting merely because a local agency possessed discretion concerning how many firefighters it would employ – and hence, in that sense, could control or perhaps even avoid the extra costs to which it would be subjected. Yet, under a strict application of the rule gleaned from *City of Merced* [citation omitted], such costs would not be reimbursable for the simple reason that the local agency’s decision to employ firefighters involves an exercise of discretion concerning, for example, how many firefighters are needed to be employed, etc. We find it doubtful that the voters who enacted article XIII B, section 6, or the Legislature that adopted Government Code section 17514, intended that result, and hence

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<sup>37</sup> *San Diego Unified School Dist.*, *supra*, 33 Cal.4th 859, 887.

<sup>38</sup> *Id.* at page 887.

we are reluctant to endorse, in this case, an application of the rule of *City of Merced* that might lead to such result.<sup>39</sup>

Ultimately, however, the court did not resolve the issue regarding the application of the *City of Merced* case to the discretionary expulsions, and resolved the case on alternative grounds.<sup>40</sup>

In the present case, the purpose of POBOR, as stated in Government Code section 3301, is to assure that stable employment relations are continued throughout the state and to further assure that effective law enforcement services are provided to all people of the state. The Legislature declared POBOR a matter of statewide concern.

In 1982, the California Supreme Court addressed the POBOR legislation in *Baggett v. Gates*.<sup>41</sup> In *Baggett*, the City of Los Angeles received information that certain peace officer employees were engaging in misconduct during work hours. The city interrogated the officers and reassigned them to lower paying positions (a punitive action under POBOR). The employees requested an administrative appeal pursuant to the POBOR legislation and the city denied the request, arguing that charter cities cannot be constitutionally bound by POBOR. The court acknowledged that the home rule provision of the Constitution gives charter cities the power to make and enforce all ordinances and regulations, subject only to the restrictions and limitations provided in the city charter. Nevertheless, the court found that the City of Los Angeles was required by the POBOR legislation to provide the opportunity for an administrative appeal to the officers.<sup>42</sup> In reaching its conclusion, the court relied, in part, on the express language of legislative intent in Government Code section 3301 that the POBOR legislation is a “matter of statewide concern.”<sup>43</sup>

The court in *Baggett* also concluded that the consequences of a breakdown in employment relations between peace officers and their employers would create a clear and present threat to the health, safety, and welfare of the citizens of the city, which would extend far beyond local boundaries.

Finally, it can hardly be disputed that the maintenance of stable employment relations between police officers and their employers is a matter of statewide concern. The consequences of a breakdown in such relations are not confined to a city’s borders. These employees provide an essential service. Its absence would create a clear and present threat not only to the health, safety, and welfare of the citizens of the city, but also to the hundreds, if not thousands, of nonresidents who daily visit there. Its effect would also be felt by the many nonresident owners of property and businesses located within the city’s borders. Our society is no longer a

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<sup>39</sup> *Id.* at pages 887-888.

<sup>40</sup> *Id.* at page 888.

<sup>41</sup> *Baggett v. Gates* (1982) 32 Cal.3d 128.

<sup>42</sup> *Id.* at page 141.

<sup>43</sup> *Id.* at page 136.

collection of insular local communities. Communities today are highly interdependent. The inevitable result is that labor unrest and strikes produce consequences which extend far beyond local boundaries.<sup>44</sup>

Thus, the court found that “the total effect of the POBOR legislation is not to deprive local governments of the right to manage and control their police departments but to secure basic rights and protections to a segment of public employees who were thought unable to secure them for themselves.”<sup>45</sup>

In 1990, the Supreme Court revisited the POBOR legislation in *Pasadena Police Officers Assn. v. City of Pasadena (Pasadena)*.<sup>46</sup> The *Pasadena* case addressed the POBOR requirement in Government Code section 3303 to require the employer to provide an officer subject to an interrogation with any reports or complaints made by investigators. In the language quoted below, the court described the POBOR legislation and recognized that the public has a high expectation that peace officers are to be held above suspicion of violation of the laws they are sworn to enforce. Thus, in order to maintain the public’s confidence, “a law enforcement agency *must* promptly, thoroughly, and fairly investigate allegations of officer misconduct ... [and] institute disciplinary proceedings.” (Emphasis added.)

Courts have long recognized that, while the off-duty conduct of employees is generally of no legal consequence to their employers, the public expects peace officers to be “above suspicion of violation of the very laws they are sworn ... to enforce.” [Citations omitted.] Historically, peace officers have been held to a higher standard than other public employees, in part because they alone are the “guardians of peace and security of the community, and the efficiency of our whole system, designed for the purpose of maintaining law and order, depends upon the extent to which such officers perform their duties and are faithful to the trust reposed in them.” [Citation omitted.] To maintain the public’s confidence in its police force, a law enforcement agency must promptly, thoroughly, and fairly investigate allegations of officer misconduct; if warranted, it must institute disciplinary proceedings.<sup>47</sup>

Under a strict application of the *City of Merced* case, the requirements of the POBOR legislation would not constitute a state-mandated program within the meaning of article XIII B, section 6 “for the simple reason” that the local entity’s ability to decide who to discipline and when “could control or perhaps even avoid the extra costs” of the POBOR legislation.<sup>48</sup> But a local entity does not decide who to investigate or discipline based on the costs incurred to the entity. The decision is made, as indicated by the Supreme Court, to maintain the public’s confidence in its police force and to protect the health, safety,

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<sup>44</sup> *Id.* at page 139-140.

<sup>45</sup> *Id.* at page 140.

<sup>46</sup> *Pasadena Police Officers Assn. v. City of Pasadena* (1990) 51 Cal.3d 564.

<sup>47</sup> *Id.* at page 571-572.

<sup>48</sup> *San Diego Unified School Dist., supra*, 33 Cal.4th 859, 887-888.

and welfare of its citizens. Thus, as indicated by the Supreme Court in *San Diego Unified School Dist.*, a finding that the POBOR legislation does not constitute a mandated program would conflict with past decisions like *Carmel Valley*, where the court found a mandated program for providing protective clothing and safety equipment to firefighters and made it clear that “[p]olice and fire protection are two of the most essential and basic functions of local government.”<sup>49</sup> Moreover, the POBOR legislation implements a state policy to maintain stable employment relations between police officers and their employers to “assure that effective services are provided to all people of the state.” POBOR, therefore, carries out the governmental function of providing a service to the public, and imposes unique requirements on local agencies to implement the state policy.<sup>50</sup> Thus, a finding that the test claim legislation does not impose a state-mandated program contravenes the purpose of article XIII B, section 6 “to preclude the state from shifting financial responsibility for carrying out governmental functions to local agencies, which are ‘ill-equipped’ to assume increased financial responsibilities” due to the tax and spend provisions of articles XIII A and XIII B.<sup>51</sup>

Accordingly, even though local decisions are first made to interrogate an officer, take punitive action against the officer, or to place an adverse comment in an officer’s personnel file, the Commission finds, based on *San Diego Unified School Dist.* and the facts presented in this case, that POBOR constitutes a state-mandated program within the meaning of article XIII B, section 6 of the California Constitution.

**B. POBOR constitutes a state-mandated program for school districts and for special districts identified in Government Code section 3301 that employ peace officers.**

Government Code section 3301, the statute that identifies the peace officers afforded the rights and protections granted in the POBOR legislation, expressly includes peace officers employed by school districts and community college districts pursuant to Penal Code section 830.32. Penal Code section 830.32 provides that members of a school district and community college district police department appointed pursuant to Education Code sections 39670 and 72330 are peace officers if the primary duty of the officer is the enforcement of law as prescribed by Education Code sections 39670 (renumbered section 38000) and 72330, and the officers have completed an approved course of training prescribed by the Commission on Peace Officer Standards and Training (POST) before exercising the powers of a peace officer.

POBOR also applies to special districts authorized by statute to maintain a police department, including police protection districts, harbor or port police, transit police, peace officers employed by the San Francisco Bay Area Rapid Transit District (BART),

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<sup>49</sup> *San Diego Unified School Dist.*, *supra*, 33 Cal.4th 859, 887-888; *Carmel Valley Fire Protection Dist. v. State* (1987) 190 Cal.App.3d 521, 537.

<sup>50</sup> *San Diego Unified School*, *supra*, 33 Cal.4th at page 874.

<sup>51</sup> *Id.* at page 888, fn. 23.

peace officers employed by airport districts, peace officers employed by a housing authority, and peace officers employed by fire protection districts.<sup>52</sup>

While counties and cities are mandated by the California Constitution to employ peace officers,<sup>53</sup> school districts and special districts are not expressly required by the state to employ peace officers. School districts and special districts have statutory authority to employ peace officers.

Following the Supreme Court's decision in *Kern High School Dist.*, the Commission denied school district test claims addressing peace officer employees on the ground that school districts are not mandated by state law to have a police department and employ peace officers. In these decisions, the Commission acknowledged the provision in the Constitution (Cal. Const., art. 1, § 28, subd. (c)) that requires K-12 school districts to maintain safe schools. The Commission found, however, that there is no constitutional or statutory requirement to maintain safe schools through school security or a school district police department. Moreover, school districts have governmental immunity under Government Code section 845 and cannot be liable for civil damages for "failure to establish a police department or otherwise to provide police protection service or, if police protection service is provided, for failure to provide sufficient police protection service."<sup>54</sup> Comments on Government Code section 845 by the Law Revision Commission state that the immunity was enacted by the Legislature to prevent judges and juries from removing the ultimate decision-making authority regarding police protection from those (local governments) that are politically responsible for making the decision.<sup>55</sup>

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<sup>52</sup> Government Code section 3301; Penal Code section 830.1, subdivision (a) ["police officer of a district (including police officers of the San Diego Unified Port District Harbor Police) authorized by statute to maintain a police department"]; Penal Code section 830.31, subdivision (d) ["A housing authority patrol officer employed by the housing authority of a ... district ..."]; Penal Code section 830.33 [(a) A member of the San Francisco Bay Area Rapid Transit District Police Department appointed pursuant to Section 28767.5 of the Public Utilities Code ... (b) Harbor or port police regularly employed and paid ... by a ... district ... (c) Transit police officers or peace officers of a ... district ... (d) Any person regularly employed as an airport law enforcement officer by a ... district ..."]; and Penal Code section 830.37 [(a) Members of an arson-investigating unit ... of a fire department or fire protection agency of a ... district ... if the primary duty of these peace officers is the detection and apprehension of persons who have violated any fire law or committed insurance fraud ... (b) Members ... regularly paid and employed in that capacity, of a fire department or fire protection agency of a ... district ... if the primary duty of these peace officers ... is the enforcement of law relating to fire prevention or fire suppression.]

<sup>53</sup> See ante, footnote 21.

<sup>54</sup> See *Leger v. Stockton Unified School Dist.* (1988) 202 Cal.App.3d 1448.

<sup>55</sup> 4 California Law Revision Commission Reports 801 (1963).

Immunity under Government Code section 845 also applies to community college districts and special districts.<sup>56</sup>

Thus, based on the Supreme Court's holding in *Kern High School Dist.*, past decisions of the Commission have determined that local entities, such as school districts, are not entitled to reimbursement for activities required by the state when the activities are triggered by the discretionary local decision to employ peace officers.

This case presents different facts, however. Here, unlike the other cases, the Legislature expressly stated in Government Code section 3301 that POBOR is a matter of statewide concern and found that it was necessary to apply the legislation to all public safety officers, as defined. Government Code section 3301 states the following:

The Legislature hereby finds and declares that the rights and protections provided to peace officers under this chapter constitute a matter of statewide concern. The Legislature further finds and declares that effective law enforcement depends upon the maintenance of stable employer-employee relations, between public safety employees and their employers. In order to assure that stable relations are continued throughout the state and to assure that effective services are provided to all people of the state, it is necessary that this chapter be applicable to all public safety officers, as defined in this section, wherever situated within the State of California.

Legislative declarations of policy are entitled to great weight by the courts "and it is not the duty or prerogative of the courts to interfere with such legislative finding unless it clearly appears to be erroneous and without reasonable foundation."<sup>57</sup>

Furthermore, in *San Diego Unified School Dist.*, the Supreme Court acknowledged the school district's argument that the due process hearing procedures were mandated when the district exercised its discretion and expelled a student, despite the *City of Merced* and *Kern* cases. The court stated the following:

Indeed, the Court of Appeal below suggested that the present case is distinguishable from *City of Merced* [citation omitted], in light of article I, section 28, subdivision (c), of the state Constitution. That constitutional subdivision, part of Proposition 8 (known as the Victim's Bill of Rights initiative, adopted by the voters at the Primary Election in June 1982), states: "All students and staff of public primary, elementary, junior high and senior high schools have the inalienable right to attend campuses which are safe, secure, and peaceful." The Court of Appeal below concluded: "In light of a school district's constitutional obligation to provide a safe educational environment ..., the incurring [due process] hearing costs ... cannot properly be viewed as a nonreimbursable 'downstream' consequence of a decision to seek to expel a student under

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<sup>56</sup> *Peterson v. San Francisco Community College Dist.* (1984) 36 Cal.3d 799; *Hernandez v. Southern California Rapid Transit Dist.* (1983) 142 Cal.App.3d 1063.

<sup>57</sup> *Paul v. Eggman* (1966) 244 Cal.App.2d 461, 471-472.

Education Code section 48915's discretionary provision for damaging or stealing school or private property, receiving stolen property, engaging in sexual harassment or hate violence, or committing other specified acts of misconduct ... that warrant such expulsion."<sup>58</sup>

In response, the Supreme Court stated that "[u]pon reflection, we agree with the District and amici curiae that there is reason to question an extension of the holding of *City of Merced* so as to preclude reimbursement under article XIII B, section 6 of the state Constitution and Government Code section 17514, whenever an entity makes an initial discretionary decision that in turn triggers mandated costs."<sup>59</sup> The court explained as follows:

Indeed, it would appear that under a strict application of the language of *City of Merced*, public entities would be denied reimbursement for state-mandated costs in apparent contravention of the intent underlying article XIII B, section 6 of the state Constitution and Government Code section 17514 and contrary to past decisions in which it has been established that reimbursement was in fact proper. For example, in *Carmel Valley* [citation omitted] an executive order requiring that county firefighters be provided with protective clothing and safety equipment was found to create a reimbursable state mandate for the added costs of such clothing and equipment. [Citation omitted.] The court in *Carmel Valley* apparently did not contemplate that reimbursement would be foreclosed in that setting merely because a local agency possessed discretion concerning how many firefighters it would employ – and hence, in that sense, could control or perhaps even avoid the extra costs to which it would be subjected. Yet, under a strict application of the rule gleaned from *City of Merced* [citation omitted], such costs would not be reimbursable for the simple reason that the local agency's decision to employ firefighters involves an exercise of discretion concerning, for example, how many firefighters are needed to be employed, etc. We find it doubtful that the voters who enacted article XIII B, section 6, or the Legislature that adopted Government Code section 17514, intended that result, and hence we are reluctant to endorse, in this case, an application of the rule of *City of Merced* that might lead to such result.<sup>60</sup>

The Department of Finance contends that the *San Diego Unified School Dist.* case does not support the finding that the test claim legislation constitutes a reimbursable state-mandated program for school districts. Finance acknowledges the language in *San Diego Unified School Dist.* declining to extend the *City of Merced* decision to preclude reimbursement whenever any entity makes a discretionary decision that triggers mandated costs. Finance argues, however, that the Supreme Court's findings are not

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<sup>58</sup> *San Diego Unified School Dist.*, *supra*, 33 Cal.4th at page 887, footnote 22.

<sup>59</sup> *Id.* at page 887.

<sup>60</sup> *Id.* at pages 887-888.

applicable to school districts since there is no requirement in law for school districts to form a police department. Finance states the following:

In the *Carmel Valley Fire Protection District* case ((1987) 190 Cal.App.3d 521), unlike the situation here, the fire districts did not have the option to form a fire department and hire firefighters. In fact, the *San Diego Unified School Dist.* case cited *Carmel Valley* to make it clear that “[p]olice and fire protection are two of the most essential and basic functions of local government.” (*San Diego Unified School Dist.*, *supra*, 33 Cal.4th 859, 887-888, *Carmel Valley Fire Protection Dist.*, *supra*, 190 Cal.App.3d 521, 537). Such is not the case for school districts and community college districts.

As stated above, there is no requirement in law for these districts to form a police department and safe schools can be maintained without the need to hire police officers as is evidenced by the many school districts that do not have police departments. The fact that the Legislature has declared it necessary for POBOR to apply to all public safety officers is not the same as requiring their hiring in the first place. School districts could, indeed, control or even avoid the extra cost of the POBOR legislation by not forming a police department at all, which is materially different from fire protection services that must be provided by fire protection districts. POBOR activities that might be claimed by school districts are, instead, analogous to non-reimbursable activities in the *Department of Finance v. Commission on State Mandates [Kern High School Dist.]* case that flowed from an underlying exercise of discretion and those in past Commission decisions that denied reimbursement to school districts for other peace officer activities.

Finance makes no comments with respect to special districts, however, who also have the authority, but are not required, to employ peace officers.<sup>61</sup> Moreover, the fire protection districts in *Carmel Valley* were not mandated by the state to be formed, as asserted by Finance. Fire protection districts are established either by petition of the voters or by a resolution adopted by the legislative body of a county or city within the territory of the proposed district. Once a petition has been certified or a resolution adopted, the local agency formation commission must approve the formation of the district “with or without amendment, wholly, partially, or conditionally.” A local election is then held and the

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<sup>61</sup> See, for example, Public Utilities Code section 28767.5, which authorizes BART to employ peace officers:

The district may employ a suitable security force. The employees of the district that are designated by the general manager as security officers shall have the authority and powers conferred by Section 830.9 of the Penal Code upon peace officers. The district shall adhere to the standards for recruitment and training of peace officers established by the Commission on Peace Officer Standards and Training ...



district is created if a majority of the votes are cast in favor of forming the district.<sup>62</sup> Furthermore, the implication that the phrase “local government” in the *Carmel Valley* case excludes school districts is wrong. “Local government” is specifically defined in article XIII B, section 8 of the Constitution to include school districts and special districts. The definitions in article XIII B, section 8 apply to the mandate reimbursement provisions of section 6. Article XIII B, section 8 states in relevant part the following:

As used in this article and except as otherwise expressly provided herein:

(d) “Local government” means any city, county, city and county, school district, special district, authority, or other political subdivision of or within the state.

Therefore, the arguments raised by the Department of Finance do not resolve the issue. The Supreme Court in *San Diego Unified School Dist.* did not resolve the issue either. Rather, the court stated the following:

In any event, we have determined that we need not address in this case the problems posed by such an application of the rule articulated in *City of Merced*, because this aspect of the present case can be resolved on an alternative basis.<sup>63</sup>

Thus, the Commission has the difficult task of resolving the issue for purposes of this claim. For the reasons below, the Commission finds that the POBOR legislation constitutes a state-mandated program for school districts and the special districts identified in Government Code section 3301 that employ peace officers.

Under a strict application of the *City of Merced* case, the requirements of the POBOR legislation would not constitute a state-mandated program within the meaning of article XIII B, section 6 for school districts and the special districts that employ peace officers “for the simple reason” that the ability of the school district or special district to decide whether to employ peace officers “could control or perhaps even avoid the extra costs” of the POBOR legislation.<sup>64</sup> But here, the Legislature has declared that, as a matter of statewide concern, it is necessary for POBOR to apply to all public safety officers, as defined in the legislation. As previously indicated, the California Supreme Court concluded that the peace officers identified in Government Code section 3301 of the POBOR legislation provide an “essential service” to the public and that the consequences of a breakdown in employment relations between peace officers and their employers would create a clear and present threat to the health, safety, and welfare of the citizens of the state.<sup>65</sup>

In addition, in 2001, the Supreme Court determined that school districts, apart from education, have an “obligation to protect pupils from other children, and also to protect teachers themselves from violence by the few students whose conduct in recent years has

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<sup>62</sup> Health and Safety Code sections 13815 et seq.

<sup>63</sup> *San Diego Unified School Dist.*, *supra*, 33 Cal.4th 859, 888.

<sup>64</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>65</sup> *Baggett*, *supra*, 32 Cal.3d 128, 139-140.

prompted national concern.” The court further held that California fulfills its obligations under the safe schools provision of the Constitution (Cal. Const., art. I, § 28, subd. (c)) by permitting local school districts to establish a police or security department to enforce rules governing student conduct and discipline.<sup>66</sup> The arguments by the school districts regarding the safe schools provision of the Constitution caused the Supreme Court in *San Diego Unified School Dist.* to question the application of the *City of Merced* case.<sup>67</sup>

The Legislature has also recognized the essential services provided by special district peace officers in Government Code section 53060.7. The special districts identified in that statute (Bear Valley Community Services District, Broadmoor Police Protection District, Kensington Police Protection and Community Services District, Lake Shastina Community Services District, and Stallion Springs Community Services District) “wholly supplant the law enforcement functions of the county within the jurisdiction of that district.”

Thus, as indicated by the Supreme Court in *San Diego Unified School Dist.*, a finding that the POBOR legislation does not constitute a state-mandated program for school districts and special districts identified in Government Code section 3301 would conflict with past decisions like *Carmel Valley*, where the court found a mandated program for providing protective clothing and safety equipment to firefighters and made it clear that “[p]olice and fire protection are two of the most essential and basic functions of local government.”<sup>68</sup> The constitutional definition of “local government” for purposes of article XIII B, section 6 includes school districts and special districts. (Cal. Const., art. XIII B, § 8.)

Accordingly, the Commission finds that POBOR constitutes a state-mandated program for school districts that employ peace officers. The Commission further finds that POBOR constitutes a state-mandated program for the special districts identified in Government Code section 3301. These districts include police protection districts, harbor or port police, transit police, peace officers employed by airport districts, peace officers employed by a housing authority, and peace officers employed by fire protection districts.

### **III. Does the test claim legislation constitute a new program or higher level of service and impose costs mandated by the state within the meaning of article XIII B, section 6 of the California Constitution and Government Code section 17514?**

Government Code section 3313 requires the Commission to review its previous findings to clarify whether the test claim legislation constitutes a new program or higher level of service and imposes costs mandated by the state consistent with the California Supreme Court Decision in *San Diego Unified School Dist.* and other applicable court decisions. The test claim legislation will impose a new program or higher level of service, and costs mandated by the state when it compels a local entity to perform activities not previously

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<sup>66</sup> *In re Randy G.* (2001) 26 Cal.4th 556, 562-563.

<sup>67</sup> *San Diego Unified School Dist.*, *supra*, 33 Cal.4th 859, 887, fn. 22.

<sup>68</sup> *Id.* at pages 887-888; *Carmel Valley Fire Protection Dist. v. State* (1987) 190 Cal.App.3d 521, 537.

required, and results in actual increased costs mandated by the state.<sup>69</sup> In addition, none of the exceptions to reimbursement found in Government Code section 17556 can apply. The activities found by the Commission to be mandated are analyzed below.

### Administrative Appeal

Government Code section 3304, as added by the test claim legislation, provides that “no punitive action, nor denial of promotion on grounds other than merit, shall be undertaken by any public agency without providing the public safety officer with an opportunity for administrative appeal.”

Punitive action is defined in Government Code section 3303 as follows:

“For the purpose of this chapter, punitive action means any action that may lead to dismissal, demotion, suspension, reduction in salary,<sup>70</sup> written reprimand, or transfer for purposes of punishment.”

The California Supreme Court determined that the phrase “for purposes of punishment” in the foregoing section relates only to a transfer and not to other personnel actions.<sup>71</sup> Thus, in transfer cases, the peace officer is required to prove that the transfer was intended for purposes of punishment in order to be entitled to an administrative appeal. If the transfer is to “compensate for a deficiency in performance,” however, an appeal is not required.<sup>72</sup>

In addition, at least one California appellate court determined that employers must extend the right to an administrative appeal under the test claim legislation to peace officers for other actions taken by the employer that result in “disadvantage, harm, loss or hardship” and impact the peace officer’s career.<sup>73</sup> In *Hopson*, the court found that an officer who received a report in his personnel file by the police chief regarding a shooting in violation of policies and procedures was entitled to an administrative appeal under Government Code section 3304. The court held that the report constituted “punitive action” under the test claim legislation based on the source of the report, its contents, and its potential impact on the career of the officer.<sup>74</sup>

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<sup>69</sup> *San Diego Unified School Dist.*, *supra*, 33 Cal.4th 859, 878; *Lucia Mar Unified School Dist.*, *supra*, 44 Cal.3d 830, 835.

<sup>70</sup> The courts have held that “reduction in salary” includes loss of skill pay (*McManigal v. City of Seal Beach* (1985) 166 Cal.App.3d 975, pay grade (*Baggett v. Gates* (1982) 32 Cal.3d 128, rank (*White v. County of Sacramento* (1982) 31 Cal.3d 676, and probationary rank (*Henneberque v. City of Culver City* (1983) 147 Cal.App.3d 250).

<sup>71</sup> *White v. County of Sacramento* (1982) 31 Cal.3d 676.

<sup>72</sup> *Holcomb v. City of Los Angeles* (1989) 210 Cal.App.3d 1560; *Heyenga v. City of San Diego* (1979) 94 Cal.App.3d 756; *Orange County Employees Assn., Inc. v. County of Orange* (1988) 205 Cal.App.3d 1289.

<sup>73</sup> *Hopson v. City of Los Angeles* (1983) 139 Cal.App.3d 347, 354, relying on *White v. County of Sacramento* (1982) 31 Cal.3d 676, 683.

<sup>74</sup> *Id* at p. 353-354.

Thus, under Government Code section 3304, as it existed when the Statement of Decision was adopted, the employer is required to provide the opportunity for an administrative appeal to permanent, at-will or probationary peace officers for any action leading to the following actions:

- Dismissal.
- Demotion.
- Suspension.
- Reduction in salary.
- Written reprimand.
- Transfer for purposes of punishment.
- Denial of promotion on grounds other than merit.
- Other actions against the employee that results in disadvantage, harm, loss or hardship and impacts the career opportunities of the employee.

The test claim legislation does not specifically set forth the hearing procedures required for the administrative appeal. Rather, the type of administrative appeal is left up to the discretion of each local entity.<sup>75</sup> The courts have determined, however, that the type of hearing required under Government Code section 3304 must comport with due process standards.<sup>76,77</sup>

Finally, the courts have been clear that the administrative hearing required by Government Code section 3304 does *not* mandate an investigatory process. “It is an adjudicative process by which the [peace officers] hope to restore their reputations” and

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<sup>75</sup> *Binkley v. City of Long Beach* (1993) 16 Cal.App.4th 1795, 1806.

<sup>76</sup> *Doyle v. City of Chino* (1981) 117 Cal.App.3d 673, 684. In addition, the court in *Stanton v. City of West Sacramento* (1991) 226 Cal.App.3d 1438, 1442, held that the employee’s due process rights were protected by the administrative appeals process mandated by Government Code section 3304.

<sup>77</sup> At least two cases have referred to the need for an administrative appeals procedure that would enable the officer to obtain court review pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5. Such a review implies that an evidentiary hearing be held from which a record and findings may be prepared for review by the court. (*Doyle, supra*, 117 Cal.App. 3d 673; *Henneberque, supra*, 147 Cal.App.3d 250. In addition, the California Supreme Court uses the words “administrative appeal” of section 3304 interchangeably with the word “hearing.” (*White, supra*, 31 Cal.3d 676.) A hearing before the Chief of Police was found to be appropriate within the meaning of Government Code section 3304 in a case involving a written reprimand since the Chief of Police was not in any way involved in the investigation and the employee and his attorney had an opportunity to present evidence and set forth arguments on the employee’s behalf. (*Stanton, supra*, 226 Cal.App.3d 1438, 1443.)

where “the reexamination [of the employer’s decision] must be conducted by someone who has not been involved in the initial determination.”<sup>78</sup>

In 1999, the Commission concluded that under certain circumstances, the administrative appeal required by the POBOR legislation was already required to be provided by the due process clause of the United States and California Constitutions when an action by the employer affects an employee’s property interest or liberty interest. A permanent employee with civil service protection, for example, has a property interest in the employment position if the employee is dismissed, demoted, suspended, receives a reduction in salary, or receives a written reprimand. Under these circumstances, the permanent employee is entitled to a due process hearing.<sup>79</sup>

In addition, the due process clause applies when the charges supporting a dismissal of a probationary or at-will employee harms the employee’s reputation and ability to find future employment.<sup>80</sup> For example, an at-will employee, such as the chief of police, is entitled to a liberty interest hearing (or name-clearing hearing) under the state and federal constitutions when the dismissal is supported by charges of misconduct, mismanagement, and misjudgment – all of which “stigmatize [the employee’s] reputation and impair his ability to take advantage of other employment opportunities in law enforcement administration.”<sup>81</sup> In *Williams v. Department of Water and Power*, a case cited by the City of Sacramento, the court explained that the right to a liberty interest hearing arises in cases involving moral turpitude. There is no constitutional right to a liberty interest hearing when an at-will employee is removed for incompetence, inability to get along with others, or for political reasons due to a change of administration.

The mere fact of discharge from public employment does not deprive one of a liberty interest hearing. [Citations omitted.] Appellant must show her dismissal was based on charges of misconduct which “stigmatize” her reputation or “seriously impair” her opportunity to earn a living. [Citations omitted.] ... “Nearly any reason assigned for dismissal is likely to be to some extent a negative reflection on an individual’s ability, temperament, or character. [Citation omitted.] But not every dismissal assumes a constitutional magnitude.” [Citation omitted.]

The leading case of *Board of Regents v. Roth* (1972) 408 U.S. 564, 574 [unofficial cite omitted] distinguishes between a stigma of moral turpitude, which infringes the liberty interest, and other charges such as incompetence or inability to get along with coworkers which does not. The Supreme Court recognized that where “a person’s good name, reputation, honor or integrity is at stake” his right to liberty under the Fourteenth Amendment is implicated and deserves constitutional protection. [Citation omitted.] “In the context of *Roth*-type cases, a

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<sup>78</sup> *Caloca v. County of San Diego* (2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 433, 443-444 and 447-448.

<sup>79</sup> See original Statement of Decision (AR, p. 864).

<sup>80</sup> See original Statement of Decision (AR, pp. 863-866, 870).

<sup>81</sup> *Binkley v. City of Long Beach* (1993) 16 Cal.App.4th 1795, 1807.

charge which infringes one's liberty can be characterized as an accusation or label given the individual by his employer which belittles his worth and dignity as an individual and, as a consequence is likely to have severe repercussions of which primarily affect professional life, and which may well force the individual down one or more notches in the professional hierarchy." [Citation omitted.]<sup>82</sup>

Thus, the Commission found that, when a hearing was required by the due process clause of the state and federal constitutions, the activity of providing the administrative appeal did not constitute new program or higher level of service, or impose costs mandated by the state pursuant to Government Code section 17556, subdivision (c).

The Commission found that the administrative appeal constitutes a new program or higher level of service, and imposes costs mandated by the state, in those situations where the due process clause of the United States and California Constitutions did not apply. These include the following:

- Dismissal, demotion, suspension, salary reduction or written reprimand received by *probationary and at-will employees* whose liberty interest *are not* affected (i.e.; the charges do not harm the employee's reputation or ability to find future employment).
- Transfer of permanent, probationary and at-will employees for purposes of punishment.
- Denial of promotion for permanent, probationary and at-will employees for reasons other than merit.
- Other actions against permanent, probationary and at-will employees that result in disadvantage, harm, loss or hardship and impact the career opportunities of the employee.

As noted by the Commission in the Statement of Decision and parameters and guidelines, the Legislature amended Government Code section 3304 in 1998 by limiting the right to an administrative appeal to only those peace officers "who [have] successfully completed the probationary period that may be required" by the employing agency and to situations where the chief of police is removed. (Stats. 1998, ch. 786, § 1.) Thus, as of January 1, 1999, providing the opportunity for an administrative appeal to probationary and at-will peace officers (except when the chief of police is removed) is no longer a reimbursable state-mandated activity.

Thus, the issue is whether the activity of providing the opportunity for an administrative appeal is reimbursable under current law when (1) permanent peace officer employees are subject to punitive actions, as defined in Government Code section 3303, or denials of promotion on grounds other than merit; and when (2) a chief of police is subject to removal.

As indicated above, under prior law, permanent employees were already entitled to an administrative hearing pursuant to the due process clause of the United States and

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<sup>82</sup> *Williams v. Department of Water and Power* (1982) 130 Cal.App.3d 677, 684-685.

California Constitutions if they were subject to the following punitive actions: dismissal, demotion, suspension, reduction in salary, or a written reprimand. In addition, an at-will employee, such as the chief of police, was entitled to a due process liberty interest hearing under prior law if the charges supporting the dismissal constitute moral turpitude that harms the employee's reputation and ability to find future employment. The County of Los Angeles argues, however, that under the California Supreme Court decision in *San Diego Unified School District*, reimbursement must be expanded to include all activities required under the test claim statute, including those procedures previously required by the due process clause. A close reading of the *San Diego Unified School District* case, however, shows that it does not support the County's position.

The County relies on the Supreme Court's analysis on pages 879 (beginning under the header "2. Are the hearing costs state-mandated?") through page 882 of the *San Diego Unified School District* case. There, the court addressed two test claim statutes: Education Code section 48915, which *mandated* the school principal to immediately suspend and recommend the expulsion of a student carrying a firearm or committing another specified offense; and Education Code section 48918, which lays out the due process hearing requirements once the mandated recommendation is made to expel the student. The court recognized that the expulsion recommendation required by Education Code section 48915 was mandated "in that it establishes conditions under which the state, rather than local officials, has made the decision requiring a school district to incur the costs of an expulsion hearing."<sup>83</sup> The Commission and the state, relying on Government Code section 17556, subdivision (c), argued, however, that the district's costs are reimbursable only if, and to the extent that, hearing procedures set forth in Education Code section 48918 exceed the requirements of federal due process.<sup>84</sup> The court disagreed. The court based its conclusion on the fact that the expulsion decision mandated by Education Code 48915, which triggers the district's costs incurred to comply with due process hearing procedures, did not implement a federal law. Thus, the court concluded that all costs incurred that are triggered by the state-mandated expulsion, including those that satisfy the due process clause, are fully reimbursable. The court's holding is as follows:

[W]e cannot characterize any of the hearing costs incurred by the District, triggered by the mandatory provision of Education Code section 48915, as constituting a federal mandate (and hence being nonreimbursable). We conclude that under the statutes existing at the time of the test claim in this case (state legislation in effect through mid-1994), all such hearing costs – those designed to satisfy the minimum requirements of federal due process, and those that may exceed those requirements – are, with respect to the mandatory expulsion provision of section 48915, state mandated costs, fully reimbursable by the state.<sup>85</sup>

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<sup>83</sup> *San Diego Unified School Dist.*, *supra*, 33 Cal.4th at page 880.

<sup>84</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>85</sup> *Id.* at pages 881-882.

The POBOR legislation is different. The costs incurred to comply with the administrative appeal are *not* triggered by a state-mandated event, but are triggered by discretionary decisions made by local officials to take punitive action, or deny a promotion on grounds other than merit against a peace officer employee. Therefore, the Commission finds that the court's holding, authorizing reimbursement for *all* due process hearing costs triggered by a state-mandated event, does not apply to this case.

Rather, what applies from the *San Diego Unified School Dist.* decision to the administrative appeal activity mandated by Government Code section 3304 is the court's holding regarding discretionary expulsions. In the *San Diego* case, the court analyzed the portion of Education Code section 48915 that provided the school principal with the discretion to recommend that a student be expelled for specified conduct. If the recommendation was made and the district accepted the recommendation, then the district was required to comply with the mandatory due process hearing procedures of Education Code section 48918.<sup>86</sup> In this situation, the court held that reimbursement for the procedural hearing costs triggered by a local discretionary decision to seek an expulsion was not reimbursable because the hearing procedures were adopted to implement a federal due process mandate.<sup>87</sup> The court found that the analysis by the Second District Court of Appeal in *County of Los Angeles v. Commission on State Mandates (County of Los Angeles II)* was instructive.<sup>88</sup> In the *County of Los Angeles II* case, the court determined that even in the absence of the test claim statute, counties would be still be responsible for providing services under the constitutional guarantees of federal due process.<sup>89</sup>

This analysis applies here. As indicated above, permanent employees were already entitled to an administrative hearing pursuant to the due process clause of the United States and California Constitutions if they were subject to the following punitive actions: dismissal, demotion, suspension, reduction in salary, or a written reprimand. In addition, an at-will employee, such as the chief of police, was entitled to a due process hearing under prior state and federal law if the charges supporting the dismissal constitute moral turpitude that harms the employee's reputation and ability to find future employment. Thus, even in the absence of Government Code section 3304, local government would still be required to provide a due process hearing under these situations.

The City of Sacramento, however, contends in comments to the draft staff analysis that prior law does not require due process protections outlined by the Supreme Court in

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<sup>86</sup> *San Diego Unified School Dist.*, *supra*, 33 Cal.4th at pages 884-890.

<sup>87</sup> *Id.* at page 888.

<sup>88</sup> *Id.* at page 888-889; *County of Los Angeles v. Commission on State Mandates* (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 805. The test claim statute in *County of Los Angeles* required counties to provide indigent criminal defendants with defense funds for ancillary investigation services for capital murder cases. The court determined that even in the absence of the test claim statute, indigent defendants in capital cases were entitled to such funds under the Sixth Amendment of the federal Constitution. (*Id.* at p. 815.)

<sup>89</sup> *San Diego Unified School Dist.*, *supra*, 33 Cal.4th at page 888-889; *County of Los Angeles*, *supra*, 32 Cal.App.4th at page 815.



*Skelly v. State Personnel Board* (1975) 15 Cal.3d 194, for employees receiving short-term suspensions, reclassifications, or reprimands. The City states that five-day suspensions, written reprimands and other lesser forms of punishment are covered by POBOR, but not *Skelly* and, thus, the administrative appeal required by POBOR is reimbursable for the lesser forms of punishment.

The City raised the same argument when the Commission originally considered the test claim, and the Commission disagreed with the arguments.<sup>90</sup> The Commission finds that the Commission's original conclusion on this issue is correct.

As discussed below, the City is correct that the *pre-disciplinary* protections outlined in *Skelly* do not apply to a short-term suspension or written reprimand. But prior law still requires due process protection, including an administrative hearing, when a permanent employee receives a short-term suspension, reprimand, or other lesser form of punishment. Thus, the administrative hearing required by the test claim legislation under these circumstances does not constitute a new program or higher level of service or impose costs mandated by the state.

*Skelly* involved the discharge of a permanent civil service employee. The court held that such employees have a property interest in the permanent position and the employee may not be dismissed or subjected to other forms of punitive action without due process of law. Based on the facts of the case (that a discharged employee faced the bleak prospect of being without a job and the need to seek other employment hindered by the charges against him), the court held that the employee was entitled to receive notice of the discharge, the reasons for the action, a copy of the charges and materials upon which the action is based, and the right to a hearing to respond to the authority imposing the discipline *before* the discharge became effective.<sup>91</sup> The Supreme Court in *Skelly* recognized, however, that due process requirements are not so inflexible as to require an evidentiary trial at the *preliminary* stage in every situation involving the taking of property. Although some form of notice and hearing must preclude a final deprivation of property, the timing and content of the notice, as well as the nature of the hearing will depend on the competing interests involved.<sup>92</sup>

Three years after *Skelly*, the Supreme Court decided *Civil Service Association v. the City and County of San Francisco*, a case involving the short-term suspensions of eight civil service employees.<sup>93</sup> The court held that the punitive action involved with a short-term suspension is minor and does not require pre-disciplinary action procedures of the kind required by *Skelly*.<sup>94</sup> But the employees were still entitled to due process protection,

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<sup>90</sup> See original Statement of Decision (AR, pp. 865-866).

<sup>91</sup> *Skelly, supra*, 15 Cal.3d 194, 213-215.

<sup>92</sup> *Id.* at page 209.

<sup>93</sup> *Civil Service Association v. City and County of San Francisco* (1978) 22 Cal.3d 552.

<sup>94</sup> *Id.* at page 560.

including the right to a hearing, since the temporary right of enjoyment to the position amounted to a taking for due process purposes.<sup>95</sup> The court held as follows:

However, while the principles underlying *Skelly* do not here compel the granting of predisciplinary procedures there mentioned, it does not follow that the employees are totally without right to hearing. *While due process does not guarantee to these appellants any Skelly-type predisciplinary hearing procedure, minimal concepts of fair play and justice embodied in the concept of due process require that there be a 'hearing,' of the type hereinafter explained.* The interest to be protected, i.e., the right to continuous employment, is accorded due process protection. While appellants may not in fact have been deprived of a salary earned but only of the opportunity to earn it, they had the expectancy of earning it free from arbitrary administrative action. [Citation omitted.] This expectancy is entitled to some modicum of due process protection. [Citation and footnote omitted.]

For the reasons state above, however, we believe that such protection will be adequately provided in circumstances such as these by procedures of the character outlined in *Skelly*, (i.e., one that will apprise the employee of the proposed action, the reasons therefore, provide for a copy of the charges including materials upon which the action is based, and the right to respond either orally or in writing, to the authority imposing the discipline) *if provided either during the suspension or within reasonable time thereafter.*<sup>96</sup> (Emphasis added.)

Thus, the court held that the employees that did not receive a hearing at all were entitled to one under principles of due process.<sup>97</sup> As indicated in the Commission's original Statement of Decision, the Third District Court of Appeal in the *Stanton* case also found that due process principles apply when an employee receives a written reprimand without a corresponding loss of pay.<sup>98</sup>

Therefore, in the following situations, the Commission finds that the Commission's original decision in this case was correct in that Government Code section 3304 does not constitute a new program or higher level of service, or impose costs mandated by the state pursuant to Government Code section 17556, subdivision (c), since the administrative appeal merely implements the due process requirements of the state and federal Constitutions:

- When a permanent employee is subject to a dismissal, demotion, suspension, reduction in salary, or a written reprimand.

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<sup>95</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>96</sup> *Id.* at page 564.

<sup>97</sup> *Id.* at page 565.

<sup>98</sup> *Stanton, supra*, 226 Cal.App.3d 1438, 1442.

- When the charges supporting the dismissal of a chief of police constitute moral turpitude, which harms the employee’s reputation and ability to find future employment, thus imposing the requirement for a liberty interest hearing.

The due process clause, however, does not apply when a permanent employee is transferred for purposes of punishment, denied a promotion on grounds other than merit, or suffers other actions that result in disadvantage, harm, loss or hardship that impacts the career opportunities of the permanent employee. In addition, the due process clause does not apply when local officials want to remove the chief of police under circumstances that do not create a liberty interest since the chief of police is an at-will employee and does not have a property interest in the position. Providing the opportunity for an administrative appeal under these circumstances is new and not required under prior law. In addition, none of the exceptions in Government Code section 17556 to the finding of costs mandated by the state apply to these situations.

Accordingly, the Commission finds that Government Code section 3304 constitutes a new program or higher level of service and imposes costs mandated by the state within the meaning of article XIII B, section 6 of the California Constitution and Government Code section 17514 for providing the opportunity for an administrative appeal in the following circumstances only:

- When a permanent employee is transferred for purposes of punishment, denied a promotion on grounds other than merit, or suffers other actions that result in disadvantage, harm, loss or hardship that impacts the career opportunities of the permanent employee.
- When local officials want to remove the chief of police under circumstances that do not create a liberty interest (i.e., the charges do not constitute moral turpitude, which harms the employee’s reputation and ability to find future employment).

### Interrogations

Government Code section 3303 prescribes protections that apply when “any” peace officer is interrogated in the course of an administrative investigation that might subject the officer to the punitive actions listed in the section (dismissal, demotion, suspension, reduction in salary, written reprimand, or transfer for purposes of punishment). The procedures and rights given to peace officers under section 3303 do not apply to any interrogation in the normal course of duty, counseling, instruction, or informal verbal admonition by, or other routine or unplanned contact with, a supervisor. In addition, the requirements do not apply to an investigation concerned solely and directly with alleged criminal activities.<sup>99</sup>

The Commission found that the following activities constitute a new program or higher level of service and impose costs mandated by the state:

- When required by the seriousness of the investigation, compensating the peace officer for interrogations occurring during off-duty time in accordance with regular department procedures. (Gov. Code, § 3303, subd. (a).)

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<sup>99</sup> Government Code section 3303, subdivision (i).

- Providing prior notice to the peace officer regarding the nature of the interrogation and identification of the investigating officers. (Gov. Code, § 3303, subds. (b) and (c).)
- Tape recording the interrogation when the peace officer employee records the interrogation. (Gov. Code, § 3303, subd. (g).)

Government Code section 3313 directs the Commission to review these findings in order “to clarify whether the subject legislation imposed a mandate consistent with California Supreme Court Decision in *San Diego Unified School Dist. v. Commission on State Mandates* (2004) 33 Cal.4th 859 and other applicable court decisions.” The Commission finds that neither the *San Diego Unified School Dist.* case, nor any other court decision published since 1999, changes the Commission’s conclusion that these activities constitute a new program or higher level of service and impose costs mandated by the state. Thus, these activities remain eligible for reimbursement when interrogating “any” peace officer, including probationary, at-will, and permanent officers that might subject the officer to punitive action.

The Commission also found that Government Code section 3303, subdivision (g), requires that:

- The peace officer employee shall have access to the tape recording of the interrogation if (1) any further proceedings are contemplated or, (2) prior to any further interrogation at a subsequent time.
- The peace officer shall be entitled to a transcribed copy of any interrogation notes made by a stenographer or any reports or complaints made by investigators or other persons, except those that are deemed confidential.

The Commission found that providing the employee with access to the tape prior to a further interrogation at a subsequent time constitutes a new program or higher level of service and imposes costs mandated by the state. However, the due process clause of the United States and California Constitutions already requires the employer to provide an employee who holds either a property or liberty interest in the job with the materials upon which the punitive, disciplinary action is based. Thus, the Commission found that even in the absence of the test claim legislation, the due process clause requires employers to provide the tape recording of the interrogation, and produce the transcribed copy of any interrogation notes made by a stenographer or any reports or complaints made by investigators or other persons, except those that are deemed confidential, to the peace officer employee when:

- a permanent employee is dismissed, demoted, suspended, receives a reduction in pay, or written reprimand; or
- a probationary or at-will employee is dismissed and the employee’s reputation and ability to obtain future employment is harmed by charges of moral turpitude, which support the dismissal.

Under these circumstances, the Commission concluded that the requirement to provide these materials under the test claim legislation *does not* impose a new program or higher level of service because this activity was required under prior law through the due

process clause. Moreover, pursuant to Government Code section 17556, subdivision (c), the costs incurred in providing these materials merely implements the requirements of the United States Constitution.

The Commission finds that the conclusion denying reimbursement to provide these materials following the interrogation when the activity is already required by the due process clause of the United States and California Constitutions is consistent with the Supreme Court's ruling in *San Diego Unified School Dist.* The costs incurred to comply with these interrogation activities are *not* triggered by a state-mandated event, but are triggered by discretionary decisions made by local officials to interrogate an officer. Under these circumstances, the court determined that even in the absence of the test claim statute, counties would still be responsible for providing services under the constitutional guarantees of due process under the federal Constitution.<sup>100</sup>

Thus, the Commission finds that the Commission's decision, that Government Code section 3303, subdivision (g), constitutes a new program or higher level of service and imposes costs mandated by the state for the following activities, is legally correct:

- Provide the employee with access to the tape prior to any further interrogation at a subsequent time, or if any further proceedings are contemplated and the further proceedings fall within the following categories:
  - (a) the further proceeding is not a disciplinary punitive action;
  - (b) the further proceeding is a dismissal, demotion, suspension, salary reduction or written reprimand received by a probationary or at-will employee whose liberty interest *is not* affected (i.e., the charges supporting the dismissal do not harm the employee's reputation or ability to find future employment);
  - (c) the further proceeding is a transfer of a permanent, probationary or at-will employee for purposes of punishment;
  - (d) the further proceeding is a denial of promotion for a permanent, probationary or at-will employee for reasons other than merit;
  - (e) the further proceeding is an action against a permanent, probationary or at-will employee that results in disadvantage, harm, loss or hardship and impacts the career of the employee.
- Produce transcribed copies of any notes made by a stenographer at an interrogation, and copies of reports or complaints made by investigators or other persons, except those that are deemed confidential, when requested by the officer following the interrogation, in the following circumstances:
  - (a) when the investigation *does not* result in disciplinary punitive action; and
  - (b) when the investigation results in:
    - a dismissal, demotion, suspension, salary reduction or written reprimand received by a probationary or at-will employee whose liberty interest *is*

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<sup>100</sup> *San Diego Unified School Dist.*, *supra*, 33 Cal.4th at page 888-889; *County of Los Angeles*, *supra*, 32 Cal.App.4th at page 815.

*not* affected (i.e.; the charges supporting the dismissal do not harm the employee’s reputation or ability to find future employment);

- a transfer of a permanent, probationary or at-will employee for purposes of punishment;
- a denial of promotion for a permanent, probationary or at-will employees for reasons other than merit; or
- other actions against a permanent, probationary or at-will employee that result in disadvantage, harm, loss or hardship and impact the career opportunities of the employee.

In comments to the draft staff analysis, the Counties of Orange, Los Angeles, and Alameda, and the City of Sacramento contend that the interrogation of an officer pursuant to the test claim legislation is complicated and requires the employer to fully investigate in order to prepare for the interrogation. The County of Orange further states that “[t]hese investigations can vary in scope and depth from abuses of authority, the use of deadly force, excessive force when injuries may be significant, serious property damage, and criminal behavior.” These local agencies are requesting reimbursement for the time to investigate.

The Commission disagrees and finds that investigation services are not reimbursable. First, investigation of criminal behavior is specifically excluded from the requirements of Government Code section 3303. Government Code section 3303, subdivision (i), states that the interrogation requirements do not apply to an investigation concerned solely and directly with alleged criminal activities. Moreover, article XIII B, section 6, subdivision (a)(2), and Government Code section 17556, subdivision (g), state that no reimbursement is required for the enforcement of a crime.

The County of Los Angeles supports the argument that reimbursement for investigative services is required by citing Penal Code section 832.5, which states that each department that employs peace officers shall establish a procedure to investigate complaints. Penal Code section 832.5, however, was not included in this test claim, and the Commission makes no findings on that statute. The County of Los Angeles also cites to the phrase in Government Code section 3303, subdivision (a), which states that “[t]he interrogation shall be conducted ...” to argue that investigation is required. The County takes the phrase out of context. Government Code section 3303, subdivision (a), states the following:

The interrogation shall be conducted at a reasonable hour, preferably at a time when the public safety officer is on duty, or during the normal waking hours for the public safety officer, unless the seriousness of the investigation requires otherwise. If the interrogation does occur during off-duty time of the public safety officer being interrogated, the public safety officer shall be compensated for any off-duty time in accordance with regular department procedures, and the public safety officer shall not be released from employment for any work missed.

Government Code section 3303, subdivision (a), establishes the timing of the interrogation, and requires the employer to compensate the interrogated officer if the

interrogation takes place during off-duty time. In other words, the statute defines the process that is due the peace officer who is subject to an interrogation. This statute does not require the employer to investigate complaints. When adopting parameters and guidelines for this program, the Commission recognized that Government Code section 3303 does not impose new mandated requirements to investigate an allegation, prepare for the interrogation, conduct the interrogation, and review responses given by officers and/or witnesses to an investigation.<sup>101</sup>

Thus, investigation services go beyond the scope of the test claim legislation and are *not* reimbursable. As explained by the courts, POBOR deals with labor relations.<sup>102</sup> It does not interfere with the employer's right to manage and control its own police department.<sup>103</sup>

Finally, the County of Orange contends that “[s]erious cases also tend to involve lengthy appeals processes that require delicate handling due to the increased rights under POBOR.” For purposes of clarification, at the parameters and guidelines phase of this claim, the Commission denied reimbursement for the cost of defending lawsuits appealing the employer action under POBOR, determining that the test claim did not allege that the defense of lawsuits constitutes a reimbursable state-mandated program.<sup>104</sup> Government Code section 3313 does not give the Commission jurisdiction to change this finding.

Nevertheless, when adopting parameters and guidelines for this program, the Commission recognized the complexity of the procedures required to interrogate an officer, and approved several activities that the Commission found to be reasonable methods to comply with the mandated activities pursuant to the authority in section 1183.1, subdivision (a)(4), of the Commission's regulations. For example, the Commission authorized reimbursement, when preparing the notice regarding the nature of the interrogation, for reviewing the complaints and other documents in order to properly prepare the notice. The Commission also approved reimbursement for the mandated interrogation procedures when a peace officer witness was interrogated since the interrogation could lead to punitive action for that officer. Unlike other reconsideration statutes that directed the Commission to revise the parameters and guidelines, the Commission does not have jurisdiction here to change any discretionary findings or add any new activities to the parameters and guidelines that may be considered reasonable methods to comply with the program. The jurisdiction in this case is very narrow and limited to reviewing the Statement of Decision to clarify, as a matter of law, whether the test claim legislation constitutes a new program or higher level of

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<sup>101</sup> Analysis adopted by the Commission on the Parameters and Guidelines, July 22, 2000 (AR, p. 912).

<sup>102</sup> *Sulier v. State Personnel Bd.* (2004) 125 Cal.App.4th 21, 26.

<sup>103</sup> *Baggett, supra*, 32 Cal.3d 128, 135.

<sup>104</sup> Analysis adopted by the Commission on the Parameters and Guidelines, July 22, 2000 Commission hearing (AR, pp. 904-906).

service and imposes costs mandated by the state consistent with the California Supreme Court Decision in *San Diego Unified School Dist.* and other applicable court decisions.<sup>105</sup>

### Adverse Comments

Government Code sections 3305 and 3306 provide that no peace officer “shall” have any adverse comment entered in the officer’s personnel file without the peace officer having first read and signed the adverse comment. If the peace officer refuses to sign the adverse comment, that fact “shall” be noted on the document and signed or initialed by the peace officer. In addition, the peace officer “shall” have 30 days to file a written response to any adverse comment entered in the personnel file. The response “shall” be attached to the adverse comment.

Thus, Government Code sections 3305 and 3306 impose the following requirements on employers:

- to provide notice of the adverse comment;<sup>106</sup>
- to provide an opportunity to review and sign the adverse comment;
- to provide an opportunity to respond to the adverse comment within 30 days; and
- to note on the document that the peace officer refused to sign the adverse comment and to obtain the peace officer’s signature or initials under such circumstances.

As noted in the 1999 Statement of Decision, the Commission recognized that the adverse comment could be considered a written reprimand or could lead to other punitive actions taken by the employer. If the adverse comment results in a dismissal, suspension, demotion, reduction in pay or written reprimand for a permanent peace officer or the comment harms an officer’s reputation and opportunity to find future employment, then the provisions of the test claim legislation which require notice and an opportunity to review and file a written response are already guaranteed under the due process clause of the state and federal constitutions.<sup>107</sup> Under such circumstances, the Commission found that the notice, review and response requirements of Government Code sections 3305 and 3306 *do not* constitute a new program or higher level of service pursuant to article XIII B, section 6 of the California Constitution. Moreover, the Commission recognized that pursuant to Government Code section 17556, subdivision (c), the costs incurred in providing notice and an opportunity to respond do not impose “costs mandated by the state”. The Commission finds that this finding is consistent with *San Diego Unified*

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<sup>105</sup> However, any party may file a request to amend the parameters and guidelines pursuant to the authority in Government Code section 17557.

<sup>106</sup> The Commission found that notice is required since the test claim legislation states that “no peace officer shall have any adverse comment entered in the officer’s personnel file *without the peace officer having first read and signed the adverse comment.*” Thus, the Commission found that the officer must receive notice of the comment before he or she can read or sign the document.

<sup>107</sup> *Hopson, supra*, 139 Cal.App.3d 347.



*School Dist.* since the local entity would be required, in the absence of the test claim legislation, to perform these activities to comply with federal due process procedures.<sup>108</sup>

However, the Commission found that under circumstances where the adverse comment affects the officer's property or liberty interest as described above, the following requirements imposed by the test claim legislation *are not* specifically required by the case law interpreting the due process clause:

- obtaining the signature of the peace officer on the adverse comment, or
- noting the peace officer's refusal to sign the adverse comment and obtain the peace officer's signature or initials under such circumstances.

The Commission approved these two procedural activities since they were not expressly articulated in case law interpreting the due process clause and, thus, exceed federal law. The City of Sacramento contends that these activities remain reimbursable.

The Commission finds, however, that the decision in *San Diego Unified School Dist.* requires that these notice activities be denied pursuant to Government Code section 17556, subdivision (c), since they are "part and parcel" to the federal due process mandate, and result in "de minimis" costs to local government.

In *San Diego Unified School Dist.*, the Supreme Court held that in situations when a local discretionary decision triggers a federal constitutional mandate such as the procedural due process clause, "the challenged state rules or procedures that are intended to implement an applicable federal law -- and whose costs are, in context, de minimis -- should be treated as part and parcel of the underlying federal mandate."<sup>109</sup> Adopting the reasoning of *County of Los Angeles II*, the court reasoned as follows:

In *County of Los Angeles II*, supra 32 Cal.App.4th 805 [unofficial cite omitted], the initial discretionary decision (in the former case, to file charges and prosecute a crime; in the present case, to seek expulsion) in turn triggers a federal constitutional mandate (in the former case, to provide ancillary defense services; in the present case, to provide an expulsion hearing). In both circumstances, the Legislature, in adopting specific statutory procedures to comply with the general federal mandate, reasonably articulated various incidental procedural protections. These protections are designed to make the underlying federal right enforceable and to set forth procedural details that were not expressly articulated in the case law establishing the respective rights; viewed singly or cumulatively, they do not significantly increase the cost of compliance with the federal mandate. The Court of Appeal in *County of Los Angeles II* concluded that, for purposes of ruling upon a claim for reimbursement, such incidental procedural requirements, producing at most de minimis added cost, should be viewed as part and parcel of the underlying federal

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<sup>108</sup> *San Diego Unified School Dist.*, supra, 33 Cal.4th 859, 888-889.

<sup>109</sup> *Id.* at page 890.

mandate, and hence nonreimbursable under Government Code section 17556, subdivision (c). We reach the same conclusion here.<sup>110</sup>

The Commission finds that obtaining the officer's signature on the adverse comment or indicating the officer's refusal to sign the adverse comment, when the adverse comment results in a punitive action protected by the due process clause, are designed to prove that the officer was on notice about the adverse comment. Since providing notice is already guaranteed by the due process clause of the state and federal constitutions under these circumstances, the Commission finds that the obtaining the signature of the officer or noting the officer's refusal to sign the adverse comment is part and parcel of the federal notice mandate and results in "de minimis" costs to local government.

Therefore, the Commission finds that, under current law, the Commission's conclusion that obtaining the signature of the peace officer on the adverse comment or noting the officer's refusal to sign the adverse comment, when the adverse comment results in a punitive action protected by the due process clause is not a new program or higher level of service and does not impose costs mandated by the state. Thus, the Commission denies reimbursement for these activities.

Finally, the courts have been clear that an officer's rights under Government Code sections 3305 and 3306 are not limited to situations where the adverse comment results in a punitive action where the due process clause may apply. Rather, an officer's rights are triggered by the entry of "any" adverse comment in a personnel file, "or any other file used for personnel purposes," that may serve as a basis for affecting the status of the employee's employment.<sup>111</sup> In explaining the point, the Third District Court of Appeal stated: "[E]ven though an adverse comment does not directly result in punitive action, it has the potential for creating an adverse impression that could influence future personnel decisions concerning an officer, including decisions that do not constitute discipline or punitive action."<sup>112</sup> Thus, the rights under sections 3305 and 3306 also apply to uninvestigated complaints. Under these circumstances (where the due process clause does not apply), the Commission determined that the Legislature, in statutes enacted before the test claim legislation, established procedures for different local public employees similar to the protections required by Government Code sections 3305 and 3306. Thus, the Commission found no new program or higher level of service to the extent the requirements existed in prior statutory law. The Commission approved the test claim for the activities required by the test claim legislation that were not previously required under statutory law.<sup>113</sup> Neither *San Diego Unified School Dist.*, nor any other

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<sup>110</sup> *Id.* at page 889.

<sup>111</sup> *Sacramento Police Officers Assn. v. Venegas* (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 916, 925.

<sup>112</sup> *Id.* at page 926.

<sup>113</sup> For example, for counties, the Commission approved the following activities that were not required under prior statutory law:

If an adverse comment is related to the investigation of a possible criminal offense, then counties are entitled to reimbursement for the following activities:

case, conflicts with the Commission’s findings in this regard. Therefore, the Commission finds that the denial of activities following the receipt of an adverse comment that were required under prior statutory law, and the approval of activities following the receipt of an adverse comment that were *not* required under prior statutory law, was legally correct.

### CONCLUSION

The Commission finds that the *San Diego Unified School Dist.* case supports the Commission’s 1999 Statement of Decision, which found that the POBOR legislation constitutes a state-mandated program within the meaning of article XIII B, section 6 of the California Constitution for counties, cities, school districts, and special districts identified in Government Code section 3301 that employ peace officers.

The Commission further finds that the *San Diego Unified School Dist.* case supports the Commission’s 1999 Statement of Decision that the test claim legislation constitutes a partial reimbursable state-mandated program within the meaning of article XIII B, section 6 of the California Constitution and Government Code section 17514 for all activities previously approved by the Commission except the following:

- The activity of providing the opportunity for an administrative appeal to probationary and at-will peace officers (except when the chief of police is removed) pursuant to Government Code section 3304 is no longer a reimbursable state-mandated activity because the Legislature amended Government Code section 3304 in 1998. The amendment limited the right to an administrative appeal to only those peace officers “who successfully completed the probationary period that may be required” by the employing agency and to situations where the chief of police is removed. (Stats. 1998, ch. 786, § 1.)

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- Providing notice of the adverse comment;
  - Providing an opportunity to review and sign the adverse comment;
  - Providing an opportunity to respond to the adverse comment within 30 days; and
  - Noting the peace officer’s refusal to sign the adverse comment on the document and obtaining the signature or initials of the peace officer under such circumstances.

If an adverse comment is not related to the investigation of a possible criminal offense, then counties are entitled to reimbursement for:

- Providing notice of the adverse comment; and
- Obtaining the signature of the peace officer on the adverse comment; or
- Noting the peace officer’s refusal to sign the adverse comment on the document and obtaining the signature or initials of the peace officer under such circumstances.

- The activities of obtaining the signature of the peace officer on the adverse comment or noting the officer's refusal to sign the adverse comment, pursuant to Government Code sections 3305 and 3306, when the adverse comment results in a punitive action protected by the due process clause<sup>114</sup> does not constitute a new program or higher level of service and does not impose costs mandated by the state pursuant to Government Code section 17556, subdivision (c).

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<sup>114</sup> Due process attaches when a permanent employee is dismissed, demoted, suspended, receives a reduction in salary, or receives a written reprimand. Due process also attaches when the charges supporting a dismissal of a probationary or at-will employee constitute moral turpitude that harms the employee's reputation and ability to find future employment and, thus, a name-clearing hearing is required.